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Abstract—The advent of energy “prosumers” that not only
consume but also produce energy, advocates a sharing market to
encourage energy exchange. Motivated by the recent technology
of online platforms, this paper proposes a simple but effective
mechanism for energy sharing by generalizing demand bidding.
Towards this end, a generic supply-demand function (SDF) is
devised for individual prosumers to determine their role of
buyer or seller in the sharing market, where the outcome is
shown to be a Nash equilibrium (NE) among prosumers. The
existence and uniqueness of NE are proved. Properties of the
equilibrium price are uncovered. Compared with individual
decision-making, the disutility of each prosumer can always be
reduced via purchasing cheaper energy in the sharing market,
leading to a Pareto improvement. It is revealed that the total
cost of prosumers decreases with the price elasticity and the
sharing market equilibrium can achieve social optimum when
the number of prosumers becomes large enough. It is also found
that introducing competition benefits social welfare. Case studies
confirm the theoretical results with analyses on the impacts of
several key factors. This work is expected to provide insights on
understanding and designing future energy sharing markets.
Index Terms—Prosumer, energy sharing, supply-demand func-
tion, game theory, Nash equilibrium
NOMENCLATURE
A. Indices and Sets
i Index of prosumers.
n Index of resources.
k Index of resource of prosumer.
I Set of prosumers.
N Set of resources.
S Set of sellers.
D Set of buyers.
Ki Set of resource of prosumer i.
fi(·) Disutility function of prosumer i.
si(·) Sharing cost of prosumer i.
mdi(·) Marginal disutility of prosumer i.
Πi(·) Total cost function of prosumer i.
Xi Action set of player i, and X = ∏iXi.
B. Parameters
I Number of prosumers.
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N Number of resources.
D0i Fixed amount of energy prosumer i consumes.
p0i The amount of energy i generates originally.
E0i The amount of energy bought from grid by i.
Di Required load reduction of prosumer i.
D,D Lower/upper bound of Di.
c,c Lower/upper bound of ci.
d,d Lower/upper bound of di.
a Price elasticity of prosumers
Ki Number of resource of prosumer i.
ci,di Coefficients of the disutility function for pro-
sumer i.
cki ,d
k
i Cost coefficients of resource k of prosumer i. .
C. Decision Variables
pi Output adjustment of prosumer i.
λc Sharing market clearing price.
bi Willingness to pay/buy of prosumer i.
b¯ Average purchase desire of all prosumers.
qi Amount of energy bought/sell from/to the sharing
market.
pki Output adjustment of resource k of prosumer i.
µi, µ
′
i Dual variable of energy balance equation in the
sharing problem of prosumer i.
ηi, η
′
i , η Dual variable of the market clearing condition.
ξ ,ξ
′
Dual variable of the energy balance equation of
the equivalent central decision-making problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE proliferation of distributed wind, solar power andenergy storage have been endowing traditional “pure”
consumers with capability of generation, precipitating the
advent of prosumers [1]. Different from traditional consumers,
prosumers can not only consume, but also produce energy.
Hence they can choose to either buy or sell energy when
participating in an energy market, which provides an opportu-
nity to flexibly exchange energy so as to enhance both the
individual utility and social efficiency [2]. In this context,
a well-designed market mechanism is desired to encourage
individual prosumers to participate in energy sharing. This
paper proposes a simple but effective mechanism based on
generalized demand bidding, making an initial step to better
understand the behavior of prosumers in energy sharing.
Nowadays, the advent of online platforms and applications
have been enabling resource sharing in more and more sectors,
such as ride-sharing (e.g., Uber, Lyft) [3], room-sharing (e.g.,
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AirBnB) [4], workplace-sharing (e.g., Upwork, Amazon Me-
chanical Turk) [5]. These sharing platforms allow people to
provide their idle goods for someone just in need and earn
profit from doing so, resulting in a win-win game. These
successes motivate a new paradigm of high-efficiency energy
utilization in power systems, where energy prosumers could
share their energy via online platforms in a similar way [6].
No surprising, such a paradigm has been gaining increasing
attentions from both the academia and the public.
Existing studies in economics have investigated the opera-
tion of resource sharing. The benefits and drawbacks of sharing
economy is discussed in [7]. The main difficulty of sharing
platform construction is the design of an appropriate sharing
mechanism, which means how the products be provided, how
the market be cleared and how the revenue be allocated.
Performance of typical sharing platforms is studied in [8]–
[10] and also their impacts on the social welfare [11]. The
influence of prices and subsidies is revealed in [12]. A review
of sharing economy can be found in [13].
As for energy sharing, the potential of game-theoretic
approaches was summarized in [14], including the applica-
tions in electric vehicles (EV), demand-side energy resource
(DER) and storage managements. The economic efficiencies
of autarky scheme, sharing scheme and aggregation scheme
were quantitatively compared in [15], showing that energy
sharing can achieve near-optimal efficiency without a central
coordinator, which is a promising scheme for future energy
market organization. An exchange article by article sharing
paradigm was investigated. Random sharing clearing price
in a storage investment problem is characterized in [16]. A
simplified time-of-use (TOU) model with peak price and off-
peak price was used. Above work initially explores the prob-
lem and opportunity of sharing in smart grid and the models
are relatively abstract and simple. More detailed analytical
studies related to resource sharing can be roughly cast into
the following three categories.
Two-sided market with clearing price. It is assumed that
there is a third-party platform. The sellers report the amount
of products they are willing to share or their cost coefficients;
the buyers report the amount of products they want or the
money they are willing to pay. After receiving all the bids, the
third-party sharing platform solves an optimization problem
with the objective function of social welfare maximization or
self-revenue maximization and clears the market. Ref. [17]
provides interesting insights into the tradeoff between revenue
maximization and social welfare maximization. The clearing
price of sharing market is analyzed in [18]. Incentive design
for electric vehicle-to-vehicle charge sharing is investigated
in [19]. System constraints such as energy-flow limits can be
taken into account in the two-sided market analysis. However,
since the supply and demand statuses of participants are pre-
determined, it can not fully capture the behaviors of prosumers
who can choose to purchase or sell changeably.
Single-sided market with set price. Different from the
two-sided market, it assumes that the statuses of participants
are symmetric, which means all of them can flexibly choose
to purchase or sell. The benefits from sharing are distributed
among prosumers via prices set by the sharing platform. An
hour-ahead optimal pricing model of energy sharing man-
agement platform is proposed based under the framework of
Stackelberg game in [20]. Energy sharing among photovoltaic
(PV) prosumers is considered in [21], taking into account
uncertainty of renewable energy generation. Two kinds of
sharing schemes, the direct sharing (within one time period)
and the buffered sharing (across different time periods), are
discussed. A supply demand ratio based pricing algorithm is
adopted in [22] for the energy sharing in PV prosumers. In
the above studies, the sharing prices are set by the platform
via solving a Stackelberg game, in which the upper level is
the platform’s pricing problem and the lower level prosumers’
decision making problems. The impact of one prosumer’s
strategy on the other prosumers’ decision is not fully captured.
Single-sided market with re-allocation. In this kind of
sharing, the benefit distribution is achieved via re-allocation
instead of price regulation. The main difficulty stems from
the design of re-allocation scheme. The renowned Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [23] could be regarded as
an example. Under VCG, each agent not only gains its own
value but also an additional payment based on an arbitrary
function of the values of the other agents. Although the VCG
re-allocation approach is ease to implement, it is not self-
budget balancing as extra bonuses outside the sharing market is
required. A cost re-allocation method for a group of electricity
storages is presented in [24], resulting in a cooperative game.
A coalitional game based algorithm was proposed in [25] for
energy exchange among microgrids. A conceptual design for
the DERs sharing is proposed in [26], where an aggregator
coordinates all DERs in real-time operation and evaluates
coordination surplus, which is split between aggregators and
prosumers. However, the redistribution after a sharing trans-
action is difficult in practice, as it requires some private
information of individual participants, e.g. the storage capacity
and the cost coefficient.
This paper proposes a simple but transparent and effective
energy sharing mechanism based on generalized demand bid-
ding. A similar framework is known as the supply function
bidding [27], [28] in demand response programs. Under this
mechanism, each seller submits his supply function to the
auctioneer, then the auctioneer sets a market clearing price
according to the submitted supply functions and the expected
total load shedding. Supply function bidding can fully capture
the impact of seller’s bid on his contracted quantity as well
as the market clearing price, and is effective in competitive
markets [29]. When it comes to the sharing market, the
situation is more complex since the prosumers not only aim to
minimize his cost but should also maintain power balancing.
Besides, sellers and buyers coexist and can change their roles
from time to time, and the equilibrium quantity is not known
in advanced. In this regard, we generalize the supply function
to a generic supply-demand function (SDF), based on which
we build a sharing market mechanism for energy prosumers.
This work possesses three salient features:
1) Sharing mechanism design. A generic supply-demand
function is proposed, enabling a generalized demand biding
based sharing mechanism. In contrast to the two-sided market
based analysis, any participant can be a prosumer that aims
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to minimize his own disutility. Moreover, different from the
single-sided market with set price, the mutual impacts among
prosumers are considered, which can better characterize the
market behavior. The model encapsulating the decision making
of prosumers turns out to be a generalized Nash game (GNG),
which can be further reduced to a standard Nash game. The
existence and uniqueness of Nash equilbrium are proved.
2) Provable properties of the sharing mechanism. Prop-
erties of the sharing equilibrium price are disclosed. It is
proved that every prosumer’s cost is no more than with
individual decision-making, leading to a Pareto improvement
and meaning that every prosumer has the motivation to par-
ticipate in sharing. Moreover, the total cost of all prosumers
decreases with the price elasticity and when the number of
prosumers is large enough, the sharing market will lead to
the same outcome as the social optimum. It is also revealed
that the proposed generalized demand bidding based sharing
mechanism is budget self-balancing and no private information
is needed for re-allocation, which is easier to implement
compared with the re-allocation based schemes.
3) Impacts of competition on social efficiency. The basic
model is based on a perfectly competitive situation, in which
every prosumer owns and controls only one resource. We
further investigate a more realistic case, in which a prosumer
could possess multiple resources. A special case provides a
proof of concept that social cost can be reduced by spreading
the resources among more prosumers which means more
competition is introduced.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The mathe-
matical formulations of energy prosumers and description of
the energy sharing mechanism are presented in Section II;
some basic properties of the sharing game are given in Section
III; The impact of competition on social welfare is studied in
Section IV; Illustrative examples are provided in Section V.
Finally, conclusions are summarized in Section VI.
II. GAME MODEL OF ENERGY SHARING
A. Energy Prosumers
In this paper, we consider the decision-making problems of
a set of prosumers I , indexed by i ∈I = {1,2..., I}. There
are N kinds of resources, indexed by n ∈ N = {1,2, ...,N},
which can be a distributed generator (DG), virtual power
plant (VPP) and etc. First, we consider the case under per-
fectly competitive market, where each prosumer i owns one
kind of resource, and we have I = N. To distinguish from
the case under imperfect competitive market, we use N to
represent the number of prosumers here. The fixed amount
of energy prosumer i consumes is D0i , and is satisfied by
the amount of energy it generates p0i as well as the energy
bought from the grid E0i . These prosumers take part in a
demand response program, and the required amount of load
reduction for prosumer i is a given value Di, which means
the amount of energy it bought from the grid needs to be
reduced by Di (D ≤ Di ≤ D). Each prosumer changes its
resource output to meet the load adjustment. For example,
to reduce its load by Di > 0, prosumer i needs to increase
pi by Di. Any deviation from the original operating point
will cause disutility. The disutility function of prosumer i is a
quadratic function fi(pi) = cip
2
i +dipi, where pi is the output
adjustment of resource and 0< c≤ ci ≤ c, 0< d ≤ di ≤ d are
the cost coefficients. When a prosumer i ∈ I takes part in
a demand response program individually, there is no room
for optimization since pi = Di is clearly the solution. The
corresponding cost is fi(Di).
However, the result under individual decision-making may
not be the most efficient if prosumers with different marginal
disutilities are allowed to trade with others. In such a cir-
cumstance, the design of an effective profit allocation scheme,
from which all prosumers take part in sharing can benefit,
is desired. The traditional supply function bidding in demand
response program cannot be applied because of the simulta-
neous non-deterministic clearing quantity and clearing price
as a prosumer can changeably acts as either a producer or a
consumer. Hence a more general bidding mechanism, which
can reflect prosumers’ willingness to buy or sell energy while
determining both the clearing quantity and price, are necessary.
B. Generic Supply-Demand Function
In this subsection, we propose a generic supply-demand
function by generalizing the conventional supply function, so
as to consider the situation where the participant can flexibly
change his role between a seller and a buyer.
In the sharing market, the demand (or supply) function of
each prosumer can be expressed by
qi = aiλc+ bi (1)
where λc is the market clearing price, qi is the amount of
energy (qi > 0 means he is a buyer and gets energy from the
sharing market, qi < 0 means he is a seller and sells energy to
the sharing market). ai < 0 represents price elasticity and bi
shows his willingness to buy. For simplification, we assume all
prosumer have the same price sensitivity, i.e. ai= a< 0, i∈N .
The average purchase desire is defined as b¯= (∑i bi)/N. The
market clears when the net quantity ∑i qi = 0 and the obtained
sharing price is
λc =−∑i bi/Na=−b¯/a (2)
here bi ≥ b¯ implies prosumer i is more willing to buy than the
average. We have qi = aλc+bi ≥ 0, and the prosumer appears
to be a buyer. Similarly, a prosumer who has less willingness
to buy than the average (bi ≤ b¯) turns to be a seller (qi ≤
0). In consequence, the statuses of prosumers are determined
spontaneously by their purchase desires, which enable a simple
but effective sharing mechanism, as we explain.
C. Energy Sharing Mechanism
The sharing mechanism follows these three steps.
Step 1: Estimate the value of price elasticity a via historical
data. Each prosumer i bids bi to the sharing platform. The
average purchase desire is b¯= ∑i bi/N
Step 2: Clear the sharing market by setting price to λc(b) =
−∑i bi/Na, which is called the equilibrium price. The amount
of energy prosumer i gets is qi(b) = aλc(b)+ bi
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Step 3: If bi ≥ b¯, the amount of energy qi(b) ≥ 0, which
means prosumer i will buy qi(b) from the sharing market and
his payment is λc(b)qi(b). Otherwise, if bi ≤ b¯, the amount of
energy qi(b)≤ 0, which means prosumer i will sell −qi(b) to
the sharing market and he will get −λc(b)qi(b).
Under this setting, the sharing market clears when
∑i∈S (−qi) = ∑i∈D qi (3)
S is the set of sellers, D is the set of buyers and each pro-
sumer i belongs to either S or D , which means I =S ∪D .
Hence equation (3) also implies
∑i∈I (aλc+ bi) = 0 (4)
D. Energy Sharing as A Generalized Nash Game
It is easy to verify that the setting price λc(b) clears the mar-
ket. When participating the sharing market, the optimization
problem of each prosumer i ∈I becomes
min
pi,bi
Πi := cip
2
i + dipi+(aλc(b)+ bi)λc(b) (5a)
s.t. pi+ aλc(b)+ bi = Di : µi (5b)
∑i (aλc(b)+ bi) = Naλc+∑i bi =0 : ηi (5c)
Here, Πi(pi,bi,b−i) is the cost function, which can be divided
into two parts: the disutility in terms of money fi(pi) := cip
2
i +
dipi and the sharing cost si(b) := (aλc+bi)λc. (5b) represents
the energy balancing. (5c) is the sharing market clearing
condition, which appears in every prosumer’s problem. µi
and ηi are corresponding Lagrangian multipliers. Due to the
common constraint (5c), problem (5) constitutes a generalized
Nash game (GNG), where players’ payoffs and strategy sets
depend on each other.
In summary, the sharing game consist of the following
elements: 1) the set of prosumers I = {1,2, ..., I}; 2) action
sets Xi(b−i)
1,∀i, and strategy space X =∏iXi; 3) cost functions
Πi(pi,bi,b−i),∀i. For simplicity, we use G = {I ,X ,Π} to
denote the sharing game (5) in an abstract form.
III. PROPERTIES OF THE SHARING GAME
A. Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
In this subsection, we show that the GNG model of energy
sharing problems can be reduced into a standard Nash game,
based on which we prove the existence and uniqueness of its
equilibrium.
Denote by b j the bids of other prosumer j ( j 6= i). From
(5c), we have
λc(b) =−
bi
Na
−
∑ j 6=i b j
Na
(6)
Substituting into (5b) yields
pi = Di−
N− 1
N
bi+
∑ j 6=i b j
N
(7)
Using bi to represent pi and λc(b), the GNG (5) degenerates
into a equivalent standard Nash game (8).
min
bi
ci
(
Di−
N− 1
N
bi+
∑ j 6=i b j
N
)2
1The subscribe −i means all players in I except i
+di
(
Di−
N− 1
N
bi+
∑ j 6=i b j
N
)
+
(
−
bi
N
−
∑ j 6=i b j
N
+ bi
)(
−
bi
Na
−
∑ j 6=i b j
Na
)
(8)
Direct computation shows that, the second derivative of the
objective function is 2
[
ci
(
N−1
N
)2
− N−1
N2a
]
> 0, implying each
prosumer solves a strictly convex optimization.
Definition 1. (Nash Equilibrium) A strategy profile (p∗,b∗) ∈
X is a Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the sharing game G =
{I ,X ,Π} defined by (5) 2, if ∀i ∈I
Πi(p
∗
i ,b
∗
i ,b
∗
−i)≤Πi(pi,bi,b
∗
−i),∀(pi,bi) ∈ Xi(b−i∗)
Given p, define λ˜ (p) := 1
N ∑i(2cipi+di) and b˜i(p) := Di−
pi− aλ˜(p). We have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique NE for the sharing game
(5). Moreover, a strategy profile (p∗,b∗) is the unique NE if
and only if, ∀i ∈I , p∗i is the unique solution of:
min
pi,∀i
∑
i
(
ci−
1
2(N− 1)a
)
p2i +
(
di+
Di
(N− 1)a
)
pi (9a)
s.t. ∑
i
pi =∑
i
Di : ξ (9b)
and b∗i = b˜i(p
∗).
The proof of Proposition 1 can be found in Appendix A.
Proposition 1 is fundamental since it ensures that the proposed
sharing game is well defined. Furthermore, it implies that
the NE computation can be greatly simplified into solving a
simpler optimization problem (9), which is strictly convex.
B. Individual Rationality of Prosumers
The next proposition shows that all the prosumers are
incentivized to share by comparing the costs of the individual
decision-making and the sharing game (5) at equilibrium.
Let Πi(p
∗
i ,b
∗) be the cost of prosumer i at the NE of sharing
game G = {I ,X ,Π} defined by (5), and fi(Di) the cost of
prosumer i with his individual optimal decision.
Proposition 2. We have
Πi(p
∗
i ,b
∗)≤ fi(Di),∀i ∈I (10)
moreover, (10) holds with strictly inequality for at least one i
unless the unique optimal solution of (9) is p∗i = Di,∀i.
The proof of Proposition 2 can be found in Appendix B.
It says that with the proposed sharing mechanism, a Pareto
improvement can be achieved for all prosumers, since the
cost of each prosumer is no worse than making decisions
individually. Hence, the sharing mechanism provides positive
incentives for prosumers to participate in the sharing market,
which is crucial for the market design.
2Given a collection of xi for i in a certain set A, x denotes the vector
x := (xi; i ∈ A) of a proper dimension with xi as its components
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C. Sharing Price and Prosumers’ Behavior
In this subsection, we clarify the relationship between the
sharing price λc that clears the market and prosumer’s marginal
disutility, as well as the resulting prosumers’ behavior.
Definition 2. (Marginal Disutility) The marginal disutility of
prosumer i, denoted by mdi, is defined as
mdi(pi) :=
∂ fi(pi)
∂ pi
= 2cipi+ di
Proposition 3. Assume (p∗,b∗) is the NE of the sharing game
(5). Then
1) the sharing price at equilibrium is given by
λ ∗c =
1
N
∑
i
mdi(p
∗
i );
2) mdi(p
∗
i )> λc(b
∗) if and only if qi(b
∗)> 0.
The proof of Proposition 3 can be found in Appendix C.
Proposition 3 says that, the clearing price at the NE is simply
the average marginal disutility of all prosumers participating in
the sharing market. Moreover, the prosumers whose marginal
disutility is larger than the average (which equals λc) have
qi(b
∗) > 0 and hence will buy energy, while whose marginal
cost is lower than the average have qi(b
∗) < 0 and hence
will sell energy. Under the proposed sharing mechanism,
a prosumer with higher/lower marginal disutility produces
less/more and purchases/sells in the sharing market.
D. Social Efficiency
To investigate the social efficiency of the proposed sharing
mechanism, consider the social planner’s problem:
min
pi,∀i∈I
∑i (cip
2
i + dipi) (11a)
s.t. ∑i pi = ∑iDi (11b)
Definition 3. (Socially Optimal) p¯ is socially optimal if p¯ is
the unique optimal solution of (11).
Optimal solution of (11) is different from the case under
individual decision-making, except for the case in which pi =
Di ∀i∈I happens to be the optimal solution to problem (11).
The difference in their optimal values interprets the loss of
social welfare. Next we reveal that the proposed energy sharing
mechanism can effectively reduce the loss of social welfare.
Invoking Proposition 1, it is easy to see, as the number
of prosumers N in model (9) approaches infinity, the NE of
the sharing problem (5) would turn to be identical to the
solution to social optimization problem (11). Next we show
the asymptotic convergence as N→ ∞.
Proposition 4. Let (p∗(N),b∗(N)) be the unique NE of (5)
and p¯(N) be the socially optimal solution of (11). Then, we
have
∑i∈I fi(p
∗
i (N)) ≥∑i∈I fi(p¯i(N))
and the average cost difference
lim
N→∞
1
N
[
∑i∈I fi(p
∗
i (N))−∑i∈I fi(p¯i(N))
]
= 0
The proof of Proposition 4 can be found in Appendix
D. Proposition 4 says that the proposed sharing mechanism
asymptotically converges to the social optimum when there is
an large enough number of prosumers in the sharing market.
Similarly, the impact of price elasticity can be analyzed by
the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Let (p∗(a),b∗(a)) be the unique NE of (5) with
price elasticity equals to a< 0. Then, we have ∑i∈I fi(p
∗
i (a))
is decreasing in |a|.
The proof of proposition 5 can be found in Appendix
E. It reveals that when |a| becomes larger, which means
the prosumers are more sensitive to the change of price,
the total social cost under sharing decreases and becomes
closer to the social optimal cost. It is worthy nothing that,
because ∑i∈I (aλc+ bi)λc = 0 holds, the group of prosumers
are budget self-balancing. It implies that no extra bonus is
needed to motivate the sharing market, which is a main
superiority compared with the renown Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) mechanism.
IV. IMPACTS OF COMPETITION
Above analysis assumes a simplified competitive market,
where each prosumer owns only one resource and there exists
no monopoly power. Next we analyze a more complicated
situation, in which prosumers could own multiple resources.
Assume that there are I multi-resource prosumers (MRP)
indexed by i ∈ I = {1,2, ..., I}. Each prosumer i owns Ki
kinds of resources labeled by k ∈Ki = {1,2, ...,Ki}. The cor-
responding energy productions are p1i , p
2
i , · · · , p
Ki
i . However,
we assume there are still N resources in total, which means
∑i∈I Ki = N. The multi-resource prosumer (MRP) i ∈I can
either carry out the demand response command individually
by solving the following problem
min
pki ,∀k∈Ki
∑
k
[
cki
(
pki
)2
+ dki
(
pki
)]
(12a)
s.t. ∑
k
pki = Di (12b)
or take part in the sharing market by solving
min
pki ,∀k∈Ki,bi
∑
k
[
cki
(
pki
)2
+ dki p
k
i
]
+(aλc+ bi)λc (13a)
s.t. ∑
k
pki + aλc+ bi = Di : µ
′
i (13b)
∑
i
(aλc)+∑
i
bi = 0 : η
′
i (13c)
Following the similar process as in Section III, we can easily
prove again that the proposed sharing mechanism can benefit
all MRPs and the equilibrium sharing price reflects the average
marginal disutility.
Definition 4. (Social Optimal for MRP) p¯ is socially optimal
(or the most efficient) if p¯ solves
min
pki ,∀i∈I ,k∈Ki
∑
i
∑
k
[
cki
(
pki
)2
+ dki p
k
i
]
(14a)
s.t. ∑
i
∑
k
pki = ∑
i
Di (14b)
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If I = 1, the sharing problem for MRP (13) becomes the
social optimal problem (14). If I =N, the sharing problem for
MRP (13) degenerates to the sharing problem in the previous
sections. If 1< I < N, the following propositions hold.
Proposition 6. The marginal disutilities of the resources for
a prosumer are equal, which means3
mdi(pi) := md
1
i
(
p1i
)
= · · ·= mdKii
(
p
Ki
i
)
, ∀i ∈I (15)
Proposition 6 can be directly deduced from the KKT con-
dition. So we omit the proof here.
Given p := (pi,∀i), we define λ˜ (p) :=
1
I ∑imdi(pi) and
b˜i(p) := Di −∑k p
k
i − aλ˜ (p). Then we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 7. There exists a unique NE for the sharing
problem with MRP (13). Moreover, a strategy profile (p∗,b∗)
is the unique NE if and only if, ∀i ∈ I , p∗i is the unique
solution of (16).
min
pki ,∀i,k∈Ki
∑
i
∑
k
[(
cki −
1
2(I− 1)a
)(
pki
)2
+
(
dki +
Di
(I− 1)a
)
pki
]
−
∑
i
∑
j>k∈Ki
pki p
j
i
(I− 1)a
(16a)
s.t. ∑
i
∑
k
pki = ∑
i
Di : ξ
′ (16b)
and b∗i = b˜i(p
∗).
The proof of Proposition 7 can be found in Appendix F.
Proposition 7 extends the result of existence and uniqueness
of the NE in the sharing game from the single-resource case
to the multi-resource one, and again provides an effective way
to simplify the computation of NE.
Then we analyze the change in efficiency based on model
(16). Generally speaking, as I varies from 1 to N, the change
in the total socially optimal cost may not be monotonous. So
we only consider a special case in which all cki = c,∀k,∀i and
Ki = KI ,∀i and gives the following proposition.
Let (I,KI ,D) denotes a scenario that there are I prosumers,
each has KI resources and the required load adjustment for
prosumer i is Di. Then, the scenario (I
′
,K
I
′ ,D
′
) is an equal
partition of (I,KI ,D) when there exists an Z ∈ Z
+, such
that I
′
= ZI and KI = ZKI′ , the resources one prosumer
possesses and required load adjustment is distributed equally
to Z prosumers and satisfies, ∀i,∀z1,z2 ∈ {1, ...,Z}
(D
′
Z(i−1)+z1
−
K
I
′
∑
k=1
pk∗
Z(i−1)+z1
)(D
′
Z(i−1)+z2
−
KI
′
∑
k=1
pk∗
Z(i−1)+z2
) ≥ 0
Z
∑
z=1
D
′
Z(i−1)+z = Di
where p∗ is the NE under scenario (I,KI ,D).
Definition 5. (Variance of marginal disutility) The variance
of marginal utilities mdk∗i ,∀k ∈KI,∀i ∈I is defined as
Var(mdk∗i , I) :=
1
N
I
∑
i=1
KI
∑
k=1
(mdk∗i −
1
N
I
∑
i=1
KI
∑
k=1
mdk∗i )
2
3pi denotes the vector pi := (p
k
i ,∀k)
Proposition 8. Suppose cki = c,∀i ∈ I ,∀k ∈ Ki and
(p∗(I),b∗(I)) is the unique NE of the sharing problem for
MRP (13) with I > 1. For any I prosumers with the same
number of resources, i.e. Ki = KI ,∀i ∈I , there always exists
an equal partition of (I,KI ,D) to (I
′
,K
I
′ ,D
′
), such that
I
′
∑
i=1
K
I
′
∑
k=1
fik(p
k∗
i (I
′
))≤
I
∑
i=1
KI
∑
k=1
fik(p
k∗
i (I))
Moreover, if −2ac≤ N, then
Var(mdk∗i , I
′
)≤Var(mdk∗i , I)
The proof can be found in Appendix G. It shows that the
system under I= 1 is the most efficient; otherwise, introducing
competition by spreading resources benefits social welfare.
Proposition 8 only considers a very special case. In Section
IV, we provide empirical results of numerical experiments to
further confirm this property.
V. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
In this section, numerical experiments are presented to
illustrate theoretical results. First, a simple case is used to
illustrate the basic setup. Then, the impacts of several factors
are analyzed, including the number of prosumers, their price
elasticities as well as the impact of competition.
A. Benchmark Case
The simplest scenario with two prosumers is taken as an
illustrative example. p1 and p2 are the output adjustment of
prosumer 1 and 2. We assume the price elasticity a = −1,
the cost coefficients c1 = 2, d1 = 3 and c2 = 4, d2 = 5. The
required demand reduction are D1 = 1 and D2 = 2. The optimal
output adjustments and the corresponding costs when making
decisions individually (IDL), taking part in the sharing market
(SMK) and the social optimal (SCO) are shown in Table I. The
best response curves of two prosumers are shown in Fig.1.
TABLE I
OPTIMAL SOLUTION UNDER IDL, SMK AND SCO
Scheme IDL SMK SCO
Optimal output adjustment p1 1.00 2.00 2.17
Optimal output adjustment p2 2.00 1.00 0.83
Cost of prosumer 1 5.00 2.00 15.89
Cost of prosumer 2 26.00 21.00 6.95
Social total cost 31.00 23.00 22.83
Relative cost difference 35.76% 0.73% –
From Table I, we can find that when the prosumers take part
in sharing, their individual costs all decrease (prosumer 1 from
5.00 to 2.00, and prosumer 2 from 26.00 to 21.00), so does
the social total cost, confirming Proposition 2. The relative
social cost difference 4 between IDL and SCO is 35.75% while
the relative social cost difference between SMK and SCO is
4Relative social cost difference(IDL,SCO)=∑ i∈I
fi(Di)−∑i∈I fi(p¯i)
∑i∈I fi(p¯i)
, Rela-
tive social cost difference(SMK,SCO)=
∑ i∈I fi(p
∗
i )−∑i∈I fi(p¯i)
∑i∈I fi(p¯i)
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Fig. 3. Variance of marginal disutilities under different N.
0.73%, showing that the sharing mechanism can greatly reduce
the social total cost. The intersection of best response curves in
Fig.1 gives the sharing market equilibrium, which is (b1,b2) =
(11,13) and the corresponding equilibrium output adjustment
is (p1, p2) = (2.0,1.0), which is the same as the results in
Table I offered by the proposed equivalent model (9), verifying
Proposition 1.
B. Impact of the Number of Prosumers
We change the number N from 2 to 30. We assume that
c= 1, c= 10, d = 2, d = 12, D= 0, D= 10. The parameters
ci, di, Di are randomly chosen within the upper and lower
bounds and 10 scenarios are tested. For each of the 10 random
scenario, the average cost difference in Proposition 4 is plotted
in Fig.2 and the variance of marginal disutilities in definition
5 (with KI = 1) is plotted in Fig. 3, both as functions of N.
In Fig.2, the average cost with sharing is always larger than
the average optimal social cost but the gap shrinks sharply
with the increase of N in all scenarios, validating Proposition
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Fig. 4. Average costs under different a.
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Fig. 5. Relative cost of sharing different numbers of MRPs with different cki
and the same Ki .
4. When N increases, the variance of marginal disutility also
drops sharply, implying that the marginal disutilities of all
prosumers under sharing become closer and all prosumers
converge to the social optimum, as shown in Fig. 3.
C. Impact of Price Elasticity
When price elasticity coefficient a varies in [−3.5,−1], the
social costs under NE are shown in Fig. 4. The optimal social
cost is marked by a dash line. From the figure, when the
absolute value of a increases, the social cost under sharing
is decreasing and gets closer to the optimal social cost. This
is in accordance with Proposition 5.
D. Impact of Competition
A special case, in which all cki = c,∀k,∀i and Ki = KI ,∀i, is
analyzed in Section IV, showing that introducing competition
improves social welfare. However, the general case is difficult
to prove. Here, we first test cases with different cki but the
same Ki; and cases with different c
k
i and Ki. We assume that
c= 1, c= 10, d = 2, d = 12, D= 0, D= 10. The parameters
cki , d
k
i and Di are randomly chosen within the ranges and 10
scenarios are tested. The resources are allocated according to
the condition (17) and the way in [30] (for same/different Ki).
To eliminate the impact of scale, relative social cost, which
equals to the ratio of costs with I > 1 and I = 1 minus 1, is
used for comparison and its change under different scenarios
with different cki and same/different Ki are given in Fig.5 and
Fig. 6, respectively.
It can be observed from Fig.5 that the relative cost is
the smallest when I = 1, which means all the resources are
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. XX, NO. X, FEB. 2019 8
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
x 10−4
Number of multi−resource prosumer (I)
R
el
at
iv
e 
so
ci
al
 c
os
t o
f s
ha
rin
g
Fig. 6. Relative cost of sharing different numbers of MRPs with different cki
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owned by one prosumer and the social optimal are achieved.
When I ≥ 2, the relative cost decreases with I, demonstrating
that competition improves economic efficiency as stated in
Proposition 8. This property extends to the case when Ki are
different as shown in Fig. 6.
VI. CONCLUSION
Prosumers endowed with distributed generators are emerg-
ing nowadays, providing a great opportunity for energy shar-
ing. By allowing prosumers to exchange energy with each
other, energy sharing can greatly reduce the cost of pro-
sumers while enhancing social efficiency. To promote energy
sharing in smart grid, a simple but transparent and effective
mechanism is proposed based on the generic supply-demand
function. This paper establishes fundamental properties of such
a sharing market by proving the existence and uniqueness
of market equilibrium, disclosing the individual rationality
of prosumers, characterizing the sharing price, comparing the
social efficiency, as well as investigating the market impact of
competition. Both theoretical analysis and case studies justify
the effectiveness of the proposed sharing mechanism.
In contrast to the existing works, the proposed mechanism
considers the choosability of prosumers to become a seller or
buyer, the equilibrium price set by market sharing, and the
fairness and operability of profit allocation. It is expected that
this work provides a fundamental, though initial, framework
for energy sharing problems. Future research directions in-
clude analyzing the behavior of such mechanism when coping
with uncertainty due to the integration of renewables.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof. Given the other prosumers’ bids b j, j 6= i, prosumer i
solves a strictly convex optimization problem. Thus, the KKT
condition below is the sufficient and necessary condition of
the optimal solution.
2cipi+ di+ µi = 0 (A.1a)
2aλc+ bi+ aµi+Naηi = 0 (A.1b)
λc+ µi+ηi = 0 (A.1c)
pi+ aλc+ bi = Di (A.1d)
Naλc+ bi+∑
j 6=i
b∗j = 0 (A.1e)
where µi is dual variable of constraint (5b) and ηi is the dual
variable of constraint (5c) for prosumer i.
Problem (9) is also a strictly convex optimization problem
and the KKT condition is
2
[
ci−
1
2(N− 1)a
]
pi+ di+
Di
(N− 1)a
+ ξ = 0 (A.2a)
∑
i
pi = ∑
i
Di (A.2b)
⇒ : If (p∗,b∗) is the NE of the sharing game, it satisfies the
KKT condition (A.1). If we sum up all (A.1d) for each i and
together with (A.1e), constraint (A.2b) is obviously satisfied.
By Na× (A.1c) - (A.1b), we have
(N− 2)aλc− bi+(N− 1)aµi = 0 (A.3)
Substitute (A.1d) into (A.3), we have
(N− 1)aλc+ pi−Di+(N− 1)aµi = 0 (A.4)
For prosumer j, we also have
(N− 1)aλc+ p j−D j+(N− 1)aµ j = 0 (A.5)
With (A.4)-(A.5), we have
pi−Di+(N− 1)aµi = p j−D j+(N− 1)aµ j (A.6)
Then with (A.1a) we have
2cipi+ di+ µi = 2c jp j+ d j+ µ j (A.7)
(A.7)-(A.6)/(N− 1)a gets
(2ci−
1
(N− 1)a
)pi+(di+
Di
(N− 1)a
)
= (2c j−
1
(N− 1)a
)p j+(d j+
D j
(N− 1)a
) (A.8a)
Then we can always find a ξ such that (A.2a) is satisfied. As
a result, p∗ is also the optimal solution of (9).
Obviously, we have b∗i =Di− p
∗
i −aλ
∗
c . λ
∗
c =
1
N ∑
i
(2cip
∗
i +
di) will be proved latter in Appendix C.
⇐: If p∗ is the optimal solution of problem (9), then by
letting
µi = −2cip
∗
i − di
λc = ξ
∗ =
1
N
∑
i
(2cip
∗
i + di)
ηi = −λc− µi
bi = Di− p
∗
i − aλc
It is easy to prove that it satisfied the KKT condition (A.1).
In consequence, the sharing problem (5) is equivalent to
the central decision-making problem (9). This completes the
proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Proof. Under SDF-based sharing mechanism, given other pro-
sumers strategies b j, j 6= i, by choosing
pi = Di, bi =
∑ j 6=i b j
(N− 1)
with
λc =−
∑ j 6=i b j
(N− 1)a
We have Πi(pi,b) = fi(Di), which means prosumer i can
acheive the same cost as under individual decision-making.
Because each prosumer solves a minimization problem, so that
we always have Π(p∗i ,b
∗)≤ fi(Di). In consequence, a Pareto
improvement is achieved for all prosumers.
If p∗i = Di does not hold for all i, then as p
∗ is the unique
optimal solution of problem (9), we always have
∑
i
(ci(p
∗
i )
2+ dip
∗
i )−∑
i
(p∗i −Di)
2
2(N− 1)a
< ∑
i
(ciD
2
i + diDi) (B.1)
and becasue ∑
i
Π(p∗i ,b
∗) = ∑
i
fi(p
∗
i ), so we have
∑
i
Π(p∗i ,b
∗)
< ∑
i
fi(Di)+∑
i
(p∗i −Di)
2
2(N− 1)a
< ∑
i
fi(Di) (B.2a)
so that at least one strict inequality of (10) holds. This
completes the proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Proof. If (p∗,b∗) is the NE of the sharing game, then it
satisfies the KKT conditions (A.1).
1) With (A.1b)-a×(A.1c), we have
η∗i =−
aλc+ b
∗
i
(N− 1)a
(C.1)
Sum up (C.1) for all i, we have ∑
i
η∗i = 0. Sum up (A.1c)
for all i and then substitute (A.1a) into it, we have
λ ∗c =
1
N
∑
i
(2cip
∗
i + di) =
1
N
∑
i
mdi(p
∗
i ) (C.2)
2) Given any b j, j 6= i, let bi(pi) =
−Npi+ ∑
j 6=i
b j+NDi
N−1 be the
unique solution of constaints (5b), (5c). Then, for any fixed
b j, j 6= i, Πi(pi,bi,b−i) = Πi(pi,bi(pi),b−i).
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Derivatives of (5b) and (5c) with respect to pi are
1+ a
∂λc
∂ pi
+
∂bi
∂ pi
= 0 (C.3)
Na
∂λc
∂ pi
+
∂bi
∂ pi
= 0 (C.4)
Solving the equations we have
∂λc
∂ pi
=
1
(N− 1)a
∂bi
∂ pi
= −
N
N− 1
In consequence, the derivative of Πi(pi,bi(pi),b−i) is
∂Πi
∂ pi
(pi,b−i)
= (2cipi+ di)−
[
λc(bi(pi),b−i)−
aλc(bi(pi),b−i)+ bi(pi)
(N− 1)a
]
(C.5)
The first term 2cipi+di is the marginal disutility of prosumer i;
the second term λc is the marginal cost he needs to pay when
buying from the market regardless of the mutual impact of
different prosumers; the third term (aλc+bi)/a(N− 1) reflects
the marginal profit deviation due to the interest conflicts among
different prosumers.
If mdi(p
∗
i ) > λc(b
∗) and qi(b
∗) < 0, then prosumer i can
always choose ∆pi < 0 to reduce his cost, and thus, it is not a
stable situation. Similarly, if mdi(p
∗
i )< λc(b
∗) and qi(b
∗)> 0,
the market is also unstable as prosumer i always has a better
choice of ∆pi > 0. As a result, mdi(p
∗
i ) > λc(b
∗) if and only
if qi(b
∗)> 0. This completes the proof.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Proof. 1) According to Proposition 1, p∗i is the unique solution
of (9) and satisfies ∑
i
p∗i = ∑
i
Di. So p
∗
i must be a feasible
solution to the social optimal problem (11). As p¯i is the
optimal solution of (11), we always have
∑
i∈I
fi(p
∗
i )≥ ∑
i∈I
fi(p¯i)
2) With the KKT conditions, we can obtain the optimal
solutions to problem (9) and (11) are
p∗i =

∑
j
D j+∑
j
d j+
D j
a(N−1)
2c j−
1
a(N−1)


1
2ci−
1
a(N−1)
∑
j
1
2c j−
1
a(N−1)
−
di+
Di
a(N−1)
2ci−
1
a(N−1)
and
p¯i =
(
∑
j
D j+∑
j
d j
2c j
)
1
2ci
∑
j
1
2c j
−
di
2ci
respectively. Moreover, we have
p¯i ≤
(
ND¯+N
d¯
2c
)
c¯
cN
−
d
2c¯
= (D¯+
d¯
2c
)
c¯
c
−
d
2c¯
(D.1a)
p¯i ≥ (ND+N
d
2c¯
)
c
c¯N
−
d¯
2c
= (D+
d
2c¯
)
c
c¯
−
d¯
2c
(D.1b)
Letting A¯ := ∑
j
1
2c j
and A∗ := ∑
j
1
2c j−
1
a(N−1)
gives
0≤ A¯−A∗ = ∑
j
− 1
a(N−1)
2c j(2c j−
1
a(N−1))
= ∑
j
1
2c j− 4ac2j(N− 1)
≤
N
2c− 4ac2(N− 1)
≤ −
1
2ac2
(D.2)
Consequently, we have
A¯−A∗
A¯
≤ −
c¯
ac2N
(D.3a)
A¯−A∗
A¯
≥ 0 (D.3b)
Let B¯ := ∑
j
d j
2c j
and B∗ := ∑
j
d j+
Dj
a(N−1)
2c j−
1
a(N−1)
. Then there are
B¯−B∗ = ∑
j
d j+ 2c jD j
−4ac2j(N− 1)+ 2c j
≤ ∑
j
|d¯+ 2 ¯cD|
−4ac2(N− 1)+ 2c
≤
|d¯+ 2 ¯cD|
−2ac2
(D.4a)
B¯−B∗ = ∑
j
d j+ 2c jD j
−4ac2j(N− 1)+ 2c j
≥
−N|d+ 2cD|
−4ac2(N− 1)+ 2c
≥
−|d+ 2cD|
−2ac2
(D.4b)
Furthermore, it is easy to see
|B∗| ≤ ∑
j
∣∣∣∣∣∣
d j+
D j
a(N−1)
2ci−
1
a(N−1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ ∑
j
|d j|+ |
D j
a(N−1) |
2c
≤ ∑
j
d¯−max{|D¯|, |D|}/a
2c
=
d¯−max{|D¯|, |D|}/a
2c
·N (D.5)
Let C¯ := di
2ci
and C∗ :=
di+
Di
a(N−1)
2ci−
1
a(N−1)
. Direct calculation gives
C¯−C∗ =
di+ 2ciDi
−4ac2i (N− 1)+ 2ci
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≤
|d¯+ 2cD|
−2c2aN
(D.6a)
C¯−C∗ =
di+ 2ciDi
−4ac2i (N− 1)+ 2ci
≥
−|d+ 2cD|
−4ac2(N− 1)+ 2c
≥
−|d+ 2cD|
−2c2aN
(D.6b)
Let E¯ :=
1
2ci
A¯
and E∗ :=
1
2ci−
1
a(N−1)
A∗
, then we have
E∗ ≤ 1
2cA∗
≤
2c¯− 1/a
2c
·
1
N
(D.7a)
E∗ ≥
1
2c¯−1/a
A∗
≥
2c
2c¯− 1/a
·
1
N
(D.7b)
and
E¯
E∗
− 1 =
A∗
A¯
2ci
2ci−
1
a(N−1)
− 1
≤ (1−
1
(−2ac¯+ 1)N
)− 1
≤ −
1
(−2ac¯+ 1)N
(D.8a)
E¯
E∗
− 1 =
A∗
A¯
2ci
2ci−
1
a(N−1)
− 1
≥
(
1+
c¯
ac2N
)(
1−
1
−acN
)
− 1
≥
c¯
ac2N
+
1
acN
(D.8b)
Therefore, there must be
E¯−E∗ ≤
(
−
1
(−2ac¯+ 1)N
)
2c¯− 1/a
2c
·
1
N
(D.9a)
E¯−E∗ ≥
(
c¯
ac2N
+
1
acN
)
2c
2c¯− 1/a
·
1
N
(D.9b)
The optimal solution of (9) and (11) can be represented as
p¯i =
(
∑
j
D j+ B¯
)
E¯− C¯
p∗i =
(
∑
j
D j+B
∗
)
E∗−C∗
First, we have∣∣∣∣∣
(
∑
j
D j+B
∗
)
(E¯−E∗)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∑
j
D j+B
∗
∣∣∣∣∣ |E¯−E∗|
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∑
j
D j+B
∗
∣∣∣∣∣M3N2
≤ (
∣∣∣∣∣∑
j
D j
∣∣∣∣∣+ |B∗|)M3N2
≤ (M1N+M2N)
M3
N2
=
M3(M1+M2)
N
(D.10)
where
M1 = max{|D|, |D¯|}
M2 =
d¯−max{|D¯|, |D|}/a
2c
M3 = max
{∣∣∣∣( 1−2ac¯+ 1)2c¯− 1/a)2c
∣∣∣∣ ,∣∣∣∣( c¯ac2 + 1ac ) 2c2c¯− 1/a
∣∣∣∣
}
(D.11)
The difference between p¯i and p
∗
i is
|p¯i− p
∗
i |
=
∣∣∣∣∣
(
∑
j
D j+ B¯
)
E¯− C¯−
(
∑
j
D j+B
∗
)
E∗+C∗
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣
(
∑
j
D j+ B¯
)
E¯−
(
∑
j
D j+B
∗
)
E¯
∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣
(
∑
j
D j+B
∗
)
E¯−
(
∑
j
D j+B
∗
)
E¯
∣∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣C¯−C∗∣∣
= |E¯(B¯−B∗)|+
∣∣∣∣∣
(
∑
j
D j+B
∗
)
(E¯−E∗)
∣∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣C¯−C∗∣∣
≤
c¯
Nc
max
{
|d¯+ 2 ¯cD|
−2ac2
,
−|d+ 2cD|
−2ac2
}
+M3(M1+M2)
1
N
+max
{
|d¯+ 2cD|
−2c2a
,
|d+ 2cD|
−2c2a
}
1
N
(D.12)
It is easy to see that |p¯i− p
∗
i | ≤
α
N
holds for a large enough
positive number α . Because P≤ p¯i≤ P¯ and−
α
N
≤ p∗i − p¯i≤
α
N
,
where
P=
(
D+
d
2c¯
)
c
c¯
−
d¯
2c
P¯=
(
D¯+
d¯
2c
)
c¯
c
−
d
2c¯
as a result, we have
2P−α ≤ 2P−
α
N
≤ p∗i + p¯i ≤ 2P¯+
α
N
≤ 2P¯+α (D.13)
For a given ε > 0, we choose a large enough number N0 :=
1
(c¯αmax{|2P−α |,|2P¯+α |}+α d¯)ε
. Then for arbitrary number N > N0,
there is
1
N
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
i∈N
fi(p
∗
i )− ∑
i∈N
fi(p¯i)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
1
N
∑
i
∣∣ci(p∗i )2+ dipi− ci(p¯i)2− di p¯i∣∣
≤
c¯
N
∑
i
|p∗i + p¯i||p
∗
i − p¯i|+
d¯
N
∑
i
|p∗i − p¯i|
≤ (c¯αmax{|2P−α|, |2P¯+α|}+α d¯)
1
N
< ε (D.14a)
This completes the proof.
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APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
Proof. Suppose that 0< |a1|< |a2|, and p
1∗ is the NE of (5)
with a = a1, and p
2∗ is the NE with a = a2. According to
Proposition 1, p1∗ and p2∗ are the unique optimal point of
problem (9) under a = a1 and a = a2, respectively. Due to
optimality,
∑i∈I fi(p
2∗
i )−
∑i∈I (p
2∗
i −Di)
2
2(N− 1)a1
≥ ∑i∈I fi(p
1∗
i )−
∑i∈I (p
1∗
i −Di)
2
2(N− 1)a1
(E.1)
which means
2|a1|(N− 1)
[
∑i∈I fi(p
2∗
i )−∑i∈I fi(p
1∗
i )
]
≥
[
∑
i∈I
(p1∗i −Di)
2− ∑
i∈I
(p2∗i −Di)
2
]
(E.2)
If we have
∑i∈I fi(p
1∗
i )< ∑i∈I fi(p
2∗
i )
then
2|a2|(N− 1)
[
∑i∈I fi(p
2∗
i )−∑i∈I fi(p
1∗
i )
]
≥ 2|a1|(N− 1)
[
∑i∈I fi(p
2∗
i )−∑i∈I fi(p
1∗
i )
]
≥
[
∑
i∈I
(p1∗i −Di)
2− ∑
i∈I
(p2∗i −Di)
2
]
(E.3)
which means
∑i∈I fi(p
2∗
i )−
∑i∈I (p
2∗
i −Di)
2
2(N− 1)a2
≥ ∑i∈I fi(p
1∗
i )−
∑i∈I (p
1∗
i −Di)
2
2(N− 1)a2
(E.4)
and is contradict to the assumption that p2∗ is the NE under
a= a2 (also the optimal solution of problem (9) under a= a2),
which completes the proof.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7
Proof. The KKT conditions of the MRP sharing problem is
2cki p
k
i + d
k
i + µ
′
i = 0,∀k ∈ Ki (F.1a)
λc+ µ
′
i +η
′
i = 0 (F.1b)
2aλc+ bi+ aµ
′
i + Iaη
′
i = 0 (F.1c)
∑
k
pki + aλc+ bi = Di (F.1d)
Iaλc+∑
i
bi = 0 (F.1e)
The KKT condition of problem (16) is[
2cki −
1
(I− 1)a
]
pki + d
k
i
+
Di
(I− 1)a
−
∑
j∈Ki, j 6=k
p
j
i
(I− 1)a
= −ξ
′
(F.2a)
∑
i
∑
k
pki = ∑
i
Di (F.2b)
→: If (p∗,b∗) is the NE of the sharing problem for MRP
(13), then it satisfies the KKT conditions (F.1). Sum up the
(F.1d) for all i and substitute (F.1e) into it, (F.2b) is met. With
(F.1b)×Ia-(F.1c) and (F.1d), we have
a(I− 2)λc+∑
k
pki + aλc−Di+(I− 1)aµ
′
i = 0 (F.3)
For another MRP u, we also have
a(I− 2)λc+∑
k
pku+ aλc−Du+(I− 1)aµ
′
u = 0 (F.4)
(F.3)-(F.4) gives
∑
k
pki −Di+(I− 1)aµ
′
i = ∑
k
pku−Du+(I− 1)aµ
′
u (F.5)
Together with (F.1a), we have
[
2cki −
1
(I− 1)a
]
pki + d
k
i +
Di
(I− 1)a
−
∑
j∈Ki, j 6=k
p
j
i
(I− 1)a
= constant
In consequence, (F.2a) is met and p∗ is also the optimal
solution of problem (16).
By (F.1c)− a× (F.1b), we have
η
′
i =−
aλc+ bi
(I− 1)a
so that ∑
i
η
′
i = 0.
By (F.1a) and (F.1b), we have
λc+η
′
i = mdi(pi) (F.6)
Sum up (F.6) for all i tells that
λ ∗c (p
∗) =
1
I
∑
i
mdi(p
∗
i )
and
b∗i (p
∗) = Di−∑
k
pk∗i − aλ
∗
c (p
∗)
←: if (p∗,b∗) is the optimal solution of problem (16), then it
satisfies the KKT conditions (F.2). If we let
µ
′
i = −(2c
k
i (p
k
i )
∗+ dki )
λc =
1
I
∑
i
mdi(p
∗
i )
η
′
i = −(µ
′
i +λc)
bi = −(aλc+∑
k
(pki )
∗) (F.7a)
It is easy to verify that (F.7) satisfies KKT condition (F.1),
and thus, (p∗,b∗) is the NE of the sharing problem (13), which
completes the proof.
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APPENDIX G
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8
Proof. We consider a special situation, where all the ci,∀i
equal to a same value c, and each prosumer possess the same
number of resource, which is KI . IKI is a fixed value equals
to N.
With the KKT condition (F.2), we have
2cpki + d
k
i +
Di− ∑
k∈Ki
pki
(I− 1)a
= −ξ
′
(G.1a)
∑
i
∑
k
pki = ∑
i
Di (G.1b)
Denote 2cpki + d
k
i as md
k
i . It is obvious that for all k ∈ Ki,
mdki are equal, and so we use mdi to represent md
k
i for all k.
Sum up (G.1a) for all i and k, we have
2c∑
i
∑
k
pki +∑
i
∑
k
dki +
KI(∑
i
Di−∑
i
∑
k∈Ki
pki )
(I− 1)a
+Nξ
′
= 0 (G.2)
Together with (G.1b), it is easy to find that ξ
′
is independent
of I and ∑
i
mdi+ Iξ
′
= 0. Assume that the optimal marginal
disutility is md∗i , then according to (G.1a), we have
Dl− ∑
k∈Ki
pk∗i
(I− 1)a
=−md∗i − ξ
′∗ (G.3)
The objective function (16a) can be rewritten as
pi := pi1+pi2
where
pi1 = ∑
i
∑
k
[c(pk∗i )
2
+ dki p
k∗
i ] = ∑
i
∑
k
(md∗i )
2− (dki )
2
4c
pi2 =−
∑
i
(Di− ∑
k∈Ki
pk∗i )
2
2(I− 1)a
=−
(I− 1)a
2
∑
i
(md∗i + ξ
′∗)2
Then we have
pi1 = ∑
i
∑
k
(md∗i )
2− (dki )
2
4c
=
KI
4c
∑
i
(md∗i )
2−∑
i
∑
k
(dki )
2
4c
=
KI
4c
∑
i
(md∗i + ξ
′∗)2+
N(ξ
′∗)2−∑
i
∑
k
(dki )
2
4c
(G.4)
The first term of (G.4) is variational and the second term is
a constant. So the change of pi1 is related with
KI
4c ∑
i
(md∗i +
ξ
′∗)2, the change of pi2 is related with −
(I−1)a
2 ∑
i
(md∗i + ξ
′∗)2
and the change of pi is related with
KI−2ac(I−1)
4c ∑
i
(md∗i +ξ
′∗)2.
Obviously,
KI−2ac(I−1)
4c
is always positive for all I > 1.
Next, we define an equal partition such that pi is decreasing.
Assume that there is I multi-resource prosumers, and the
optimal output is pk∗i . Then we introduce competition and
allocate the resources owned by one prosumer and its demand
to Z ∈ Z+ prosumers such that I
′
= ZI and KI = KI′ , and
satisfies ∀i,∀z1,z2 ∈ {1, ...,Z}
(D
′
Z(i−1)+z1
−
K
I
′
∑
k=1
pk∗
Z(i−1)+z1
)(D
′
Z(i−1)+z2
−
KI
′
∑
k=1
pk∗
Z(i−1)+z2
) ≥ 0
Z
∑
z=1
D
′
Z(i−1)+z = Di
Then
pi I∗ = pi I∗1 −∑
i
(Di−
KI
∑
k=1
pk∗i )
2
(I− 1)a
= pi I∗1 −∑
i
(
Z
∑
z=1
D
′
Z(i−1)+z−
Z
∑
z=1
K
I
′
∑
k=1
pk∗
Z(i−1)+z)
2
(I− 1)a
≥ pi I∗1 −∑
i
Z
∑
z=1
(D
′
Z(i−1)+z−
K
I
′
∑
k=1
pk∗
Z(i−1)+z)
2
(I− 1)a
≥ pi I∗1 −∑
i
Z
∑
z=1
(D
′
Z(i−1)+z−
K
I
′
∑
k=1
pk∗
Z(i−1)+z)
2
(I
′
− 1)a
≥ pi I
′
∗ (G.5a)
(G.5) tells us that the objective function pi decreases with
I. When I grows, the coefficient of pi1 (which is
KI
4c
) decreases
while the coefficient of pi2 (which is
−(I−1)a
2
) increases. If
∑
i
(mdi+ ξ
′
)2 decreases with I, then obviously pi1 decreases
with I. Otherwise, if ∑
i
(mdi + ξ
′
)2 increases with I, pi2 in-
creases with I. If pi1 also increases, then pi
I∗ < pi I
′
∗, which is
contradict to (G.5). In conclusion, we always have the social
total cost pi1 reduces with I, which means introducing effective
competition can improve social welfare.
Moreover, as
K−2ac(I−1)
4c
is always positive and reaches
the minimum when I =
√
−2ac/N. If
√
−2ac/N ≤ 1, then
K−2ac(I−1)
4c
increases with I > 1, which tells that ∑
i
(mdi+ξ
′
)2
is decreasing in I, so that
Var(mdk∗i , I) =
1
N
I
∑
i=1
KI
∑
k=1
(mdk∗i + ξ
′
)2
=
KI
N
I
∑
i=1
(mdi+ ξ
′
)2
≥
K
I
′
N
I
′
∑
i=1
(mdi+ ξ
′
)2 =Var(mdk∗i , I
′
)
This completes the proof.
